National elites acquire and mobilize national capabilities to pursue national interests in a competitive international envi- ronment in which there is no central governing order. National interests are not based simply on temporally situated pragmatic political or material goals.

They are determined in a social and psy- chological context of history, culture, and religion that makes the definition of interest an exercise unique to each set of national policymakers. At the heart of realist theory is security interest, usually narrowly defined as state independence, territorial integrity, and maintenance of the political sys- tem. In Southeast Asia, the latter is often implicitly qualified to mean conti- nuity of the incumbent elite.

The greatest part by far of the literature on Southeast Asian international relations is focused on security as traditionally defined. The most influential body of work on Southeast Asian international relations from a realist foundation is that of Michael Leifer. This involves a calculation of relative gains. International relations, rather than being a zero- sum game, can be win-win, although some win more than others.

In this ap- proach, ASEAN is a mode of international cooperation through which mem- ber states pursue national interest. With security still the realist heart of interest and the balance of power its mechanism, ASEAN as a regime for co- operative security can be placed in a realist balance of power perspective chapter 5.

What- ever is understood as an ASEAN regional interest is based on the consensual harmonizing of national interests in order to present a formal united front. As the chapters to follow will show, the cooperative face of ASEAN is best seen in its dealings with extraregional actors, not its intramural dealings where con- flict is often present. Liberalism With the advent of ASEAN, attention shifted from state actors to the as- sumed regional institutional actor. Functionalist theory was employed to sug- gest that through ASEAN specific transnational structures in the economic, technical, and social fields would evolve, to which ASEAN-wide decision- making authority would be transferred.

However, after nearly four decades, not one such structure can be located. For the realists, what integrationists call failure is in fact the political will of leaders at the state level who make conscious decisions based on national interest about which issues and at what level cooperation in ASEAN will be offered. A different approach to ASEAN draws from regime theory, which looks at habit-forming experiences of cooperation over time.

The most productive, but still unsatisfac- tory, effort to apply regime theory to Southeast Asia is in ASEAN as a security regime chapter 5. A regime is founded on learned ex- pectations about behavior in functionally specific state interactions. A com- munity, on the other hand, is defined not so much by interests, as shared values.

The decoupling of identity from institutions, however, leaves open the ques- tion of what is the link from identity to state action. ASEAN identity is not superior to national interest when it comes to actual policy choices. The academic concentration on ASEAN tends to obscure the fact that for Southeast Asian policymakers, critical areas of conflict and cooperation exist bilaterally and subregionally in both traditional interest areas and the new global agenda.

National leaders in Southeast Asia rhetorically affirm the regional identity and cooperate where interests are served, but the state is still the primary actor. The division was both political and cultural.

The Philippines, Thai- land, and Singapore refused to accept the Malaysian and Indonesian denunci- ation of the war. The member states can amplify their international voice through ASEAN as a kind of diplomatic caucus. Sim- ilar or complementing national interests can be translated to a regional inter- est even though the outcomes are received at the state level. The way that na- tional interests are cooperatively associated through ASEAN represents the link between the levels of state-region analysis.

The management of this de- pends on decision making at the state level. The Argument and Structure of the Book The chapters to follow will detail the major actors, interests, issues, key rela- tionships, structures, and institutions involved in an understanding of inter- national relations in Southeast Asia. The thematic proposition can be put simply. From independence, the states of Southeast Asia, individually and collectively, have struggled in their inter- national environments for policy autonomy.

The limits on policy independence can originate in dependencies lo- cated in the external environment, such as foreign assistance or conflict with the interests of regional or extraregional actors with greater capabilities. It can be asked whether and how ASEAN itself might constrain the policy options of its member states.

Initially, limits on autonomy were set in the context of the global Cold War and American security primacy in Southeast Asia.

The irony in the struggle for au- tonomy is that while Southeast Asian states enhance their capabilities through globalization, they meet new categories of nontraditional policy-limiting de- mands aggressively promoted not only by states, but also by international nongovernmental organizations that, unlike states, can penetrate sovereignty with direct links to domestic NGO counterparts. Chapter 2 introduces the state and nonstate actors whose actions shape for- eign policy outcomes in Southeast Asia.

Chapter 3 briefly reviews interna- tional relations in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. Chapter 4 examines the institutional structures of regionalism in Southeast Asia. Chap- ter 5 addresses conflict and modes of conflict resolution in traditional areas of security interests. With security still in mind, Chapter 6 turns to nontradi- tional security issues.

Terrorism, narcotics trafficking, piracy, and smuggling are some of the concerns. Chapter 8 examines human security in Southeast Asia on both the freedom from want and the freedom from fear conditions of human security.

The case of Myanmar is given special attention in this chapter. Chapter 9 looks at environmental issues in Southeast Asian international relations as a nontraditional issue area, bringing the re- gion into collision not only with the West, but causing antagonisms within ASEAN itself.

Chapter 10, the concluding chapter, returns to issues raised in the introduction. It asks three questions, the answers to which will shape the future of international relations in Southeast Asia.

Will democratic regimes transform international relations in Southeast Asia? The text of the Charter and its annexes can be accessed at www. Samuel P. Donald K. Clark D. David Martin Jones and M. The theoretical pluralism that informs international relations theory in South- east Asia is illustrated in a special issue of The Pacific Review 19, no.

Sheldon W. Leinbach and Richard Ulak, eds. Another geography is Chia Lin Sien, ed. Another introductory history is D. Boulder, Colo. A history with country- specific chapters is Norman G. Owen, David Chandler, and William Roff, eds. Neher, Southeast Asia: Crossroads of the World, 2nd ed.

Another general introduction to the region is Mark Beeson, ed. Donald G. There are a number of serial publications that contain current scholarship on problems and policies in Southeast Asian international relations.

It also produces the annual volume Southeast Asian Affairs covering the important political and foreign policy events of the previous year on a country basis. A leading American journal with current Southeast Asian poli- tics and international relations articles is the bimonthly Asian Survey from the University of California Press. The quarterly Pacific Af- fairs, published at the University of British Columbia, also covers Southeast Asian contemporary politics, economics, and international relations.

The Pa- cific Review, published in London, focuses on security and strategic issues in the region. There is a large array of Internet resources for the study of Southeast Asian international relations. It can be accessed at www.

The Department of State website, www. There are eleven state ac- tors in Southeast Asia. The eleventh, Timor-Leste, became independent only in The three primary extraregional actors with significant national inter- ests in Southeast Asia are the United States, China, and Japan.

Their policies set the basic economic and political parameters for the autonomy of the Southeast Asian states. Increasingly, the European Union EU , collectively act- ing for its members, looms large, not only economically but also politically.

Nonstate actors include intergovernmental international organizations, the majority of which operate under the umbrella of the United Nations system, and a wide variety of international nongovernmental organizations INGO that are independent of government mandates. Multinational corporations MNC are not included as a separate category in this IR-focused book since, despite their local political impact, their ultimate objectives are private eco- nomic interests. Finally, there is the question of what kind of international actor the regional organization ASEAN is.

As noted in chapter 1, some analyses would treat ASEAN as a separate actor with an identity independent of its member states. Even though Southeast Asian states may challenge the Western bias in the work- ings of the international system, they fully embrace sovereign equality in their relations with each other and with extraregional state actors.

It is obvious that despite the underpinning legal fiction of sovereign equality, all states in the Southeast Asian international system are not equal in terms of capabilities to promote their national interests, including defending their sovereignty. The ag- gregate of economic, political, military, cultural, and psychological factors that enable a state to defend and further its interests internationally is usually termed power.

Some states have more power than others, and power is relative in both bilateral and multilateral settings. For this chapter introducing the Southeast Asian state actors, it is necessary to choose an order of appearance.

Adhering to the principle of sovereign equality, the states are ordered alphabetically, since to use power for ranking purposes would seem to ignore the fact of the relativity of power.

The reality of power in international relations in Southeast Asia is demonstrated in the chapters that follow. Its tiny population sits atop large oil and natural gas reserves. Than Shwe Philippines Pres. Brunei is ruled as an absolute Islamic sultanate. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, who came to the throne in , is the twenty-ninth ruler in a dynasty that goes back to the fifteenth century.

Brunei was once a great maritime empire that reached to Manila. A history of political intrigue, succession struggles, and es- pecially the depredations of colonialism left modern Brunei surrounded by the East Malaysian Sarawak state. ASEAN is important to Brunei in providing a mul- tilateral framework within which to deal with Malaysia and Indonesia, the other occupants of the island of Borneo.

In the years leading up to independence, the self-governing British protectorate had contentious relations with both neigh- bors. In , Brunei signed a memorandum of understanding MOU with the United States on de- fense relations and regularly engages with the United States in exercises and training programs. The disputed Sarawak—Brunei maritime jurisdictions are one part of the broader conflict zone in the South China Sea chapter 5. Among them was Hun Sen, at first PRK foreign minister and then prime minister, who remains prime minister of Cambodia and is the longest serving head of government in Southeast Asia.

UNTAC was the international mechanism to manage in a democratic framework the rec- onciliation of the Hun Sen government and ASEAN-sponsored Cambodian nationalist opposition, while at the same time marginalizing and eventually eliminating the internationally detested KR.

Ranariddh is a son of Norodom Sihanouk, who had led Cambo- dia from independence from France, first as king and then as prime minister, until he was deposed by a military coup in In the new Cambodian gov- ernment, Sihanouk was a relatively powerless constitutional monarch, symbol of a renewed Khmer nationalism. In old age and illness, he abdicated in favor of his son Norodom Sihamoni in A new government was brokered with Hun Sen as sole prime minister and Ranariddh as leader of the CPP-dominated parliament.

Elections held in July exposed the fragility of Cambodian political stability. The deadlock threatened to plunge the country again into political turmoil. Cooperation in the coalition soon collapsed over the division of the spoils. The anti- democratic quality of the Hun Sen regime has been denounced by the United Nations human rights officials, the United States, and the European Union.

Since , the state has been dependent for more than 60 percent of its budget on the largesse of an international donor community organized in the Consultative Group for Cambodia CGC , which in became the Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum CDCF. Even though the CDCF urges reform and accountability, little reform has taken place in governance. Corruption is endemic as the country is plundered in a culture of impunity chapter 8. Domestic political frustrations tend to be vented in xenophobic demonstra- tions.

The ethnic Vietnamese presence in Cambodia became a major election issue in In , Cambodian Buddhist monks demonstrated against Viet- namese treatment of Vietnamese monks.

Thailand suspended diplomatic rela- tions with Cambodia for several weeks in after physical attacks on Thai in- terests in Phnom Penh chapter 5. It is projected that the new revenue source will begin to come on stream in It is doubt- ful, however, that Cambodia will have the institutional infrastructure or politi- cal will that would guarantee that it will not be just another honey pot for the ruling military-political elite.

Cambodia has already decided to triple its naval strength to defend its off- shore oil. This adds a new dimension to the resource conflicts in maritime Southeast Asia chapter 5. After a long struggle back from the political and economic disaster of the Sukarno years chapter 3 , in the Suharto era Indonesia finally felt itself accorded a position consonant with its geographic location, resource endow- ment, population, and political stability.

Through , there were three successive governments of post-Suharto presidents: B. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri. Caught up in the upheaval of the transition from Suharto to the volatile poli- tics of democratization, their governments were characterized by leadership failure embedded in a pervasive culture of corruption, impunity, and the seek- ing of short-term advantage.

Its capability to act internationally to promote national interests was at its lowest point since the mids, and this as it faced critical eco- nomic, political, and religious challenges. The domestic political order was characterized by political drift and state decay.

Despite a slow and grudging compliance with the strictures put in place by the international financial community, aid continued to be pledged and dis- bursed even in the absence of meaningful reform. This suggests that, perhaps like Russia after the collapse of the communist regime, Indonesia was believed to be too big and important to be allowed to fail.

As the post-Suharto govern- ments wrestled with the economy, they were also preoccupied with maintaining the integrity of the unitary republic. The lifting of the authoritarian controls of the Suharto years allowed ethnic and religious conflict to resurface politically. The international context of these conflicts will be dealt with in greater detail in chapter 5. They are part of the ummat, the univer- sal Muslim community, and are subject to the same political and emotional forces touching Muslims everywhere.

Islamic fundamentalists, suppressed by the Suharto regime, rose to challenge the secular basis of the Indonesian state. The JI is held responsible for the horrific October Bali blast and other attacks on Western soft targets. These elections gave a strong popular man- date to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Under Yudhoyono, Indonesia now stands out as a Southeast Asian success story. The state is politically stable in a consolidating democracy. Despite walking a fine political line with the Muslim community, the government has aggressively pursued counterterror- ism, cooperating with, but without relying on, the United States, Australia, and other allies in the war on terror chapter 6.

As Yudhoyono approaches the end of his first term in , he can also claim a degree of economic success with macroeconomic reforms leading to growing investor confidence and with a real GDP growth projection for — of more than 6 percent. Indonesia seems poised to rise from the political ashes of the Suharto regime and the false starts of the early post-Suharto governments to reassume its leading role in the region. China, Vietnam, and Thailand compete for economic and political influence in Laos.

After , Laos was heavily dependent on Vietnam, but it now seeks to diversify its external ties. The Laos govern- ment accuses Hmong refugees in the United States of supporting and financing the dissidents. In June , U. The LPDR is a diehard communist state. There is barely the beginning of a rudimentary civil society.

Laos began experimenting with free market reforms in , but the pace of change is slow and grudg- ing. The economy has been growing at a 6. Laos is the hub of Mekong Basin development schemes focused on building infra- structure linking southwestern China to mainland Southeast Asia as well as exploiting hydroelectric generating potential for export to Thailand and Viet- nam chapters 4 and 9. The risk in the competition for Laotian resources is that Laos will become simply a platform for projects benefiting its neighbors with little developmental payoff for Laos itself.

Mahathir bin Mohamad, handed over leadership to his deputy, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. His speeches were laced with the rhetoric of economic nationalism.

There is no question but that Malaysia is a relative economic success story. With Abdullah, what changed is not Malaysian national interests or even the policies that support interests, but a tone and style that is no longer out- spokenly and deliberately confrontational with the West, particularly the United States. Unlike his predecessor, Abdullah is not vying for an interna- tional spotlight. Malaysia still looks east, particularly to China as a natural partner in Southeast Asia.

Even though the United States is often the whipping boy for Malaysian nationalism, the bilat- eral relationship, while not filled with warmth, is reasonably good at the func- tional working levels. Malaysia continues to try to project an international image of a modern Islamic state. Malaysia is a mul- tiethnic state in which Malay Muslims make up 60 percent of the population; Chinese, 26 percent; Indians, 8 percent; and the balance, other minorities. The state is organized on the basis of Malay supremacy, in which the Malays are privileged by laws and policies that non-Malays view as politically, economi- cally, socially, and culturally discriminatory.

UMNO rules in a parliamentary coalition with smaller non-Malay ethnic parties. Sharpening ethnic divisions threaten the stability of the coalition as opposition minority parties charge that their ethnic interests are being sold out. Abdullah, like Mahathir before him, has shown that he is quite willing to use the draconian Internal Security Act ISA to suppress dissidents chapter 8.

Kuala Lumpur also has to accept the criticism of its human rights practices by Western democracies. At the state-to-state level, the government has acted properly, denying any of- ficial interference in the affairs of its ASEAN partners. At the same time, it cannot deny the aspirations of co-religionists at the peril of losing votes to its fundamentalist domestic opposition. The more than four-decade dispute with the Philippines over sovereignty in Sabah is still unresolved.

Malaysia is a contestant in the South China Sea jurisdictional strug- gle. The sharp- ening ethnic divisions were reflected in March parliamentary elections.

The army, known as the tatmadaw, has ruled since crushing democracy in In , the administrative capital was sud- denly moved from Yangon to Nay Pyi Daw, deep in the central plain between Yangon and Mandalay. Since then, NLD partisans have been arrested, harried, and forced into exile. Aung San Suu Kyi remained under arrest until She was rearrested in , re- leased in May , and rearrested again in June While a prisoner, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Since , the junta has sought a constitutional basis for its rule through a convention process that excludes the NLD and other opposition groups. Finally, there would be no accountability for the egregious and systematic violations of human rights by the military during its years of oppressing democratic and ethnic minority opposition.

A violent assault by government forces in Septem- ber on demonstrating Buddhist monks only reinforced to a shocked international audience the reality of the unchanging quality of a harsh and bloody regime chapter 8. Here we note only that Myanmar has become a pariah state, ostracized by the liberal democratic West and serving as an embarrassment to its ASEAN partners.

Except for the military and subservient civilian bureaucratic and business elite, the people are impover- ished. There is no trickle-down to the society at large. For the United States, what was special was extensive military basing rights that made the Philippines a key element in the American strat- egy of forward deployment in Asia during the Cold War chapter 3.

That tie was severed in , with the termination by the Philippines of the base agree- ments. The international dimension of Muslim separatism is dealt with in chapter 5.

Although the government is determined to wipe the NPA out by , the senior military leadership admits that this is unlikely given the commitment to the counterterrorist struggle in the south. More than two decades after the democratic revolution that overthrew the Marcos dictatorship, the political stability and legitimacy of the Philippine government is again under siege. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo came to office in under the cloud of a quasi-coup and was elected president in in a fraudulent and corrupt process.

Through , there had been three efforts to impeach her. She has used Marcos-like maneuvers to ward off do- mestic opponents chapter 8.

To maintain power, Arroyo has forged an al- liance with the military, which she has deemed the foundation of stability, but the military itself is not cohesive. For a beleaguered Arroyo government, the strategic link to the United States is vital both in terms of security assistance in its ongoing internal wars and as a mark of political support to President Arroyo herself. At the same time, she has undertaken high-profile efforts to hedge against U.

At home, President Arroyo called on the military to stand behind her as new waves of protest against government corruption broke out in early call- ing for her resignation or impeachment.

It is a Chinese nut in the jaws of an Indonesian- Malaysian nutcracker. The independent state of Singapore was born in the po- litical trauma of forced separation from Malaysia in The festering wounds of a messy divorce still impede normal relations between Malaysia and Singapore and continue to be a source of worrisome bilateral disputes chapter 5.

It has adhered to the principle that domes- tic political stability is the sine qua non of security and economic growth. To that end, the government has unrelentingly stifled political opposition through one-party electoral domination and application of its internal secu- rity act.

There is a determination to use its human and technical resources to build an economy that would be a major regional player. Singapore strives to be the financial services, communications and information technology, and trading eye of Southeast Asia. Singapore consciously practices balance-of-power politics so it is not iso- lated with bigger, and often unfriendly, neighbors.

The island-state has been accused of using its economic and financial clout to disadvantage its ASEAN partners. Its highly visible relations with China, the United States, and India are part of that balance. Even though there is no formal United States—Singa- pore military alliance analogous to those that the United States has with Thai- land and the Philippines, Singapore has been named a Major Security Coop- eration Partner and, with a Strategic Framework Agreement, is perhaps the closest U.

During the imperialist period, the Thais tried to play off the French and the British. Although forced to retrocede the territories after the war, an exile Free Thai movement, however, mitigated postwar accounta- bility to the allies. During the Cold War, Thailand, under a series of military dictatorships, opted to ally with the United States, rather than balance through nonalignment. In the post—Cold War era, the alliance endured.

In recognition of the depth and scope of the bilateral security re- lationship, President George W. Martial law was proclaimed and the most demo- cratic constitution in Southeast Asia abolished.

Thaksin had become prime minister of a coalition government in A pop- ulist with strong rural backing, Thaksin challenged the entrenched Bangkok elites, including the military and royalists, who viewed their right to rule as an entitlement rather than a democratic reward.

As Thaksin concentrated power in his hands, the army finally shut down the political system. The United States distanced itself from the Thai junta. The immediate bilateral conse- quence was the invocation of U. China quickly stepped in by offering a military assistance package to compensate for loss of U.

The appointed prime minister, retired General Surayud Chulanont, traveled to China in May , where he signed a five-year Joint Strategic Plan of Ac- tion covering a variety of programs of functional cooperation.

From the end of the Third Indochina War in chapter 3 , Thailand had viewed itself as the focal point of a stable Southeast Asian continental bloc. In the months following the coup, however, such assurance quickly evaporated.

The junta, through its ap- pointed military and civilian managers, proved to be singularly unsuccessful and incompetent. During , a junta-picked drafting commission wrote a new constitution. It was designed to prevent the reemergence of a strong pop- ular leader, returning the Thai parliamentary system to a pattern of weak fac- tionalized coalition governments of the past, and leaving real power in the hands of the traditional bureaucratic-military-royalist elite. The first elections under the new constitution for the seat parliament were held on 23 December One of the plat- form planks was bringing Thaksin back.

The outcome was interpreted as a popular repudiation of the junta. The leader of the outgoing junta warned the new civilian leaders to be sensitive to military concerns.

Former Prime Minister Thaksin returned from exile in February , but fled again into exile in mid to avoid prosecution. From January to the beginning of , almost daily violence had taken over three thousand lives. One of the major indictments leveled by the military against Thaksin was that he had not brought peace to the south. In the year and a half of overt military rule, the war in the south widened and the violence intensified.

This was acknowledged in January by incoming ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, a former Thai foreign minister, who bemoaned the fact that because of its internal conflicts Thai- land had lost its capability to contribute to regional development. Its in- dependence is noteworthy, husbanded as it was by a successful UN peace- keeping and political reconstruction mission.

Neither the East Timorese nor the international community rec- ognized the legality of the act, although countries with major interests in In- donesia accepted the fact of the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. For a quarter of a century the UN General Assembly called for an internationally supervised act of self-determination.

Indonesian rule was harshly repressive. A terrifying rampage by army-backed pro-Indonesian militias followed the referendum, killing hundreds of East Tim- orese, destroying infrastructure, and uprooting a quarter of the population. For three years UNTAET worked to reconstruct economic and administrative structures and prepare the country for independence.

Australian military reinforcements for the ISF rushed to the coun- try, and the government appealed to the UN Security Council for a continued and sustained UN presence in the country. This was initially complicated by the continued presence of East Timorese refugees in Indonesian West Timor chapter 8 and issues of reconciliation over the postreferendum atrocities chapter 8.

A host of legal issues such as Indone- sian assets, border demarcation, and maritime overlaps also remain to be set- tled through an Indonesia—Timor-Leste Joint Commission that first met in October Border demarcation will be completed by In , Timor-Leste suggested a possible five-year preparatory period for entry in Whether ASEAN will be willing to accept membership of a possibly failing state remains to be determined.

An important issue was Vietnamese cooperation in the search for Americans killed or missing in action during the war years. After lengthy negotiations on economic and human rights issues, the U. President George W. Vietnam forged its historical national identity in cen- turies of struggle to resist Chinese hegemony. Up until the collapse of the Soviet Union, communist- ruled Vietnam had relied on Moscow as its security patron. In the post—Cold War environment, Hanoi has adopted a mix of strategies to manage its rela- tions with China.

The friction-ridden China—Vietnam mile-long km land border was settled in a agreement, followed by a process of demarcation and erection of border markers that is expected to be completed by the end of The border agreement was criticized by Vietnamese nationalists for ced- ing too many of the contested areas to China, but the tight political control ex- ercised by the Vietnam Communist Party kept protest in check.

Hanoi reached an agreement with China defining territorial seas and exclusive economic zones in the Tonkin Gulf in Up to a point, the Vietnamese government has tolerated anti-China protests by Viet- namese nationalists. Vietnam still has maritime jurisdictional issues with Cambodia, and it was only in after thirty-two rounds of meetings spread over twenty-five years that it reached agreement with Indonesia over continental shelf borders.

Furthermore, Vietnam has sought to balance its China connection with vital links with other great powers. A key item was the Russian promise to aid in the modernization of the Vietnamese armed forces. Japan is a critical eco- nomic partner to Vietnam.

Although the booming U. Both Hanoi and Washington have added a strategic dimension to the development of their comprehensive interactions.

Whatever the characterization, there is no disagreement with the fact that since , the United States has been the dominant great power ex- ternal influence on international relations in Southeast Asia. The focus of that strategy was American security interests. With the ending of the Cold War, the global threat posed by a bipolar confrontation with the Soviet Union no longer is the basis for United States—Southeast Asian relations.

Replacing it in the immediate post—Cold War period was a vague, loosely formulated strategic concept initially articu- lated by President Bill Clinton in his vision of a Pacific Community rest- ing on three pillars: economic growth, political democracy, and security. It promoted an enhanced U. Chapter 7 discusses frameworks for Southeast Asian economic relations. Although the Cold War has ended, U. This is provided by the U.

A major hole in the pattern of U. The join- ing of the United States and vulnerable Southeast Asian states in a joint strug- gle against elusive terrorist enemies meant that, after more than a quarter cen- tury, U. S interests in Southeast Asia were visible to the American public. The visibility to Southeast Asian publics of the United States in the Southeast Asian front of the war on terror, particularly as it was linked to the invasion of Iraq, was strongly opposed by Muslim populations.

It was also criticized by non-Muslims concerned about great power unilateralism undermining the authority and legitimacy of the United Nations, which most Southeast Asian leaderships see as a bulwark for the security of small nations. It has been the American concentration on the war on terror and Iraq and Afghanistan that has led critics in Southeast Asia to argue that the United States has neglected its broader, and in the longer-run perhaps more impor- tant, interests, allowing China to fill a vacuum.

The priority given by the United States to the war on terror has also, critics argue, negatively spilled over onto the American political agenda of democra- tization and human rights in Southeast Asia.

In prosecuting the war on terror, the United States has condoned, and in fact praised, internal security regula- tions that are applied not just to suspected terrorists but also to civil society advocacy groups and opposition democratic activists. The American desire to maintain the alliances with the Philippines and Thailand despite the political and human rights records of their militaries and the erosion of what were once vibrant democracies can be contrasted with the American campaign against the Myanmar junta chapter 8.

To allay these concerns, a steady stream of high-level official Chinese delegations has toured the ASEAN capitals for over a decade with a focused message of common interest in re- gional peace and stability. In the background of the Southeast Asia—China relationship is a historical memory of the traditional Confucian world order in which the countries of the Nanyang—the southern ocean —were considered by the Dragon Throne to be tribute-bearing vassals. The appearance of the PRC as a regional state actor led to fears that aggressive Chinese communism might be a Marxist-Leninist- Maoist version of the traditional order.

Moreover, the Chinese minorities with divided loyalties in host Southeast Asian countries were viewed as potential Trojan horses. While it does not yet rival the United States in military power and political and eco- nomic reach, there is a sense in Southeast Asia that inevitably China—so large and so geographically close—will be the power to be reckoned with in the fu- ture. It is the need to adapt to that future that informs the present day South- east Asia—China relationship.

The Chinese economy with its 8 percent real growth rate competes with Southeast Asia in global markets and sucks up foreign di- rect investment from Japan and the West. Rather than competition, China and ASEAN are, at Chinese initiative, seeking closer economic integration, which holds either the promise of benefiting both sides or the threat of Southeast Asia becoming a Chinese market and re- source hinterland.

China has imposed political discipline on Southeast Asia with respect to Taiwan. China picked up this theme when it associated itself with the ASEAN states that opposed the American war in Iraq, denouncing American unilater- alism and its assumed role of global policeman. China has ratified the TAC. From the Southeast Asian vantage, the central question of the future struc- ture of great power involvement in the region will be the evolution of the U.

However, American interests and capabilities will still make it a major actor. The issue for the ASEAN states is not the relativity of power, but whether the United States will accommodate to a real balance of power with China or seek to contain its rising power.

The last thing that Southeast Asian leaders want is to be forced to choose between the two in the event of a U. In it, Japan foreswore a military role; defined Japan—Southeast Asian relations as an equal partnership based on mutual confidence and trust; and promised assistance to build prosperity and strengthen ASEAN to help establish a stable regional international order.

In the Cold War era, under the American security umbrella, Japan maximized its regional economic power without political and military concerns. In the post—Cold War world, however, Japan seemed more like a wounded goose rather than the leader of the flock, caught in economic stagnation, a bal- looning debt, and an aging population in a demographic trajectory toward sig- nificant population decline.

While Japan is still an important player in the Southeast Asian economies, its future leadership role can be questioned chap- ter 7. Japan has sought to influence noneconomic areas of in- ternational relations in Southeast Asia through targeted investments in re- gional peace and stability.

Japan is the largest economic assistance contributor to Cambodia and Timor-Leste. It has promised grants to help bring peace to the southern Philippines. Because of its energy dependencies, Japan has a vital interest in freedom of navigation through the South China Sea al- though it has no real capability to influence the resolution of the jurisdictional disputes there chapter 5.

If the decade-long trend of Chinese growth and Japanese relative decline continues, Japan could be relegated to a secondary role in Southeast Asia. Part of the problem, how- ever, is that real East Asia institution building cannot take place without China and Japan putting behind them their historical, political, and territorial issues. The tension-fraught Japan—China relationship has enabled ASEAN to balance between them in its claim to be the driver in command of regionalization.

In December , Prime Minister Fukuda made what has been called an historic visit to China during which both sides welcomed the warming of relations. On the one hand, Australia has sought to define itself economi- cally and quasi-politically as an Asian state. On the other hand, it has explic- itly identified the United States as its vital security partner. Both sides have sought to manage the relationship in terms of stability.

Aus- tralian policy is founded on the premise that Indonesia is more important to Australia than Australia is to Indonesia.

This was clear in twenty-five years of Australian policy toward East Timor. Vociferous domestic critics not with- standing, Australian governments refused to link East Timor to other aspects of Australian-Indonesian relations. Australia even gave official recognition to Indonesian sovereignty in East Timor in return for a generous Timor Sea bor- der agreement.

The Indonesian connection was badly frayed by the East Timor crisis. Indonesian nationalists portrayed it as a new colonialism. The first bilateral casualty was the security agreement. Denunciation of Australia became a staple of Indonesian political life. Tragi- cally, some Indonesians saw the terrorist murder of scores of young Australians in the Bali terrorist bomb blast as some kind of payback. A new chapter in the bilateral rela- tionship was opened with the signing in and ratifications in of the Lombok Pact providing for cooperation in a wide range of security and defense related activities.

The Indonesian goal was to isolate Papuan sepa- ratists from an Australian support base. In that case, Indonesia is likely to be disappointed, since it is unlikely that any Australian government would act to prohibit the free speech of advocates of West Papuan independence let alone turn over to Indonesia Papuan political asylum seekers.

The February rush of reinforcements to the Australian-led International Stabilization Force underlined this. Development was stalled until the conclusion of the Timor Sea Treaty in Canberra delayed ratification of the treaty until Dili gave up its claim of 50 percent of the much larger Sunrise field, most of which lies outside the JDA, accepting an 80—20 percent split in favor of Australia. In the interna- tional politics of the India—Myanmar—China triangle, the junta understands that China, with its growing power and UN Security Council veto, is a stronger patron.

PNG shares a more than mile-long km land border with In- donesia, dividing the island of New Guinea roughly in half. From its in- dependence from Australian trusteeship, relations with Indonesia have been dominated by Indonesian suasion, diplomacy, and intimidation to prevent the PNG side of the border from becoming a sanctuary for Free Papua Movement OPM separatist insurgents chapter 5. An Indonesia—PNG basic border agree- ment was reached in , and revised and extended in Both governments have demon- strated that they want peaceful and cooperative relations.

Russia Although Russia is not the great power actor in Southeast Asia that its pred- ecessor the Soviet Union was, under President Vladimir Putin Russia still makes its presence known, not willing to simply leave great power visibility to China, Japan, and the United States. Both the Indonesians and Malaysians and for the Russians, hopefully other Southeast Asian nations see Russia as an alternative, and cheaper, source for high-technology weapons platforms than the United States.

One involved the repayment of a Russian debt. The other was a military logistics agreement paving the way for Thai military acquisition of Russian military equipment. The International Actors in Southeast Asia 55 Nonstate Actors For purposes of this discussion, by nonstate actor we mean an intergovern- mental or nongovernmental NGO agency or organization with a program of international activity defined independently of any state actor or subgroup of state actors. The United Nations System The United Nations and its specialized agencies have been active in South- east Asia beginning with the decolonization process itself.

Indonesian inde- pendence from the Netherlands was facilitated through the fifteen-member UN Security Council as was the transfer of sovereignty of Dutch New Guinea to Indonesia. The nonperma- nent members are elected to two-year terms by secret ballot by a two-thirds majority of the member General Assembly. The candidates for the non- permanent seats are drawn from regional groups with the African-Asian group allocated five seats. Every year, five seats are contested.

In , In- donesia was elected for a — period, and in Vietnam was elected to a — seat. The year was the first time that two Southeast Asian states held Security Council seats at the same time. Vietnam, which had been campaigning for a seat since , celebrated its election as prestige-building proof of its rising global profile. The members are elected for three-year overlapping terms with the Asia grouping allocated eleven seats.

Two other UN agencies have been active in human security matters in Southeast Asia. Despite its humanitarian mission, the UNHCR often finds itself colliding with agents of host governments. Finally, the secretaries-general themselves have acted as agents for political change in Southeast Asia. Both former Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his successor, Ban Ki Moon, have used their post as bully pulpits to urge recalcitrant Southeast Asian nations like Cambodia and Myanmar to abide by the commitments to the norms and goals they accepted as members of the United Nations.

Over time, their mandates expanded to include economic development and finan- cial stability in the newly independent countries produced by decolonization. In- donesia is the largest single regional client. Table 2. Historically the Bank has concentrated on infrastructure development, which has made it a tar- get for environmentalist activists and NGOs.

This is particularly the case in Southeast Asia, where World Bank support for large-scale dam development in Southeast Asia has been vigorously protested chapter 9. More recently, the World Bank has invested in capacity building including governance and human capital.

TABLE 2. It is now a critical player in man- aging financial rescues of failing economies. The IMF has been the target of antiglobalists who reject its explicit commitment to integrating Southeast Asian economies into the global market system.

Conditionality on the terms of loans and disbursement are attacked as a new form of Western colonialism. This was two years in advance of the scheduled payment. Malaysia, on the other hand, refused IMF aid and all the strings attached. The government temporized. It has sixty-seven country mem- bers—forty-eight regional states and nineteen outside the region. Japan always provides the president of the ADB. First, there are the inter- national philanthropic institutions and foundations devoted to broad pro- gramming for economic, social, and political development.

Another set of INGOs is functionally specific and provides a particular ser- vice, often humanitarian, to a country or region. In many cases these kinds of INGOs become agencies for the delivery of government-provided financial and material humanitarian relief and reconstruction, working with or under national state or UN organizations. A third set of INGOs is thematic interest groups that seek to influence pol- icy in their interest area.

They are advocacy organizations that, while often in consultative status with governments and UN agencies, seek to influence the policy of extraregional states toward the regional states as well as the domes- tic policy of the regional states themselves.

For example, it was advocacy groups globally networking that kept the East Timor question alive for a quarter of a century even though governments wished it would go away.

Two internationally significant issue areas in which advocacy INGOs have been intensely involved are human rights and the envi- ronment, both of which raise politically sensitive questions chapters 8 and 9. INGOs do not necessarily respect the political boundaries set by state sover- eignty and can penetrate functionally through links to domestic NGOs with like cause.

Sometimes domestic NGOs have advisory or budgetary ties to foreign governments. This means their activities can be affected by the quality of the re- lationship between their own government and their foreign supporters.

For in- stance, because of Indonesian opposition to the Iraq war, the leading Indone- sian NGO with environmental concerns, Walhi Friends of the Earth Indonesia was forced to sever its relationship to foreign donors, the U. The protest, while perhaps politically necessary, certainly degraded its functional capabilities. Notes 1. The reports of the UN human rights envoys to Cambodia can be accessed at the Cambodia country link at www.

Norton, , 15— For a good overview of the democratization process in Indonesia, see Douglas E. Salazar, eds. Anthony L. The International Actors in Southeast Asia 61 Alexander L. The English language transcript of the Peking University speech was accessed at www. Voting coincidence with the U. The reports can be accessed at www. Suggestions for Further Reading Basic background data and statistics on each of the Southeast Asian countries can be found in the U.

The contemporary domestic political settings for the foreign policy of the states of the region are outlined in Damien Kingsbury, South-East Asia: A Po- litical Profile, 2nd ed. Oxford, U. For the evolution over time of the international relations and foreign poli- cies of the individual states of Southeast Asia refer to the country-chapters in the following: Charles E.

Some specific country studies are David W. At independence, Southeast Asian states were caught up in the dynamics of great power competition. Burma, with its 1, mile-long 2, km border with China, was the first noncommunist state to recognize the PRC.

These were facilitated by Thailand and the United States. In , an angry Burmese government terminated its American aid program and took the issue to the United Nations. Many of the Nationalist troops were eventually repatriated to Taiwan. Others were pushed by the Burmese army across the Thai border where they settled down.

The affair confirmed Burma in the correctness of its policy of strict neutralism and nonalign- ment. For nearly four decades Rangoon isolated itself from the international politics of the region. National Security Council memorandum outlined the American view of the strategic problem posed by communist expansion through Vietnam.

The es- tablishment of the PRC provided the Vietnamese both material and technical assistance. Washington viewed the Korean War and the French struggle in Indochina through the same lens of communist threat. By , the French were exhausted. The United States, unwilling to inter- vene directly in support of the French, had provided over a billion dollars of assistance.

The United States did not associ- ate itself with the final document but in a separate statement declared that it would refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the agreement. The Geneva agreement called for national elections in , but they were never held, with both sides blaming the other.

Laos and Cambodia were theoretically neutralized. The operative heart of the Manila Pact stated that the parties to the treaty rec- ognized that aggression by armed attack in the treaty area on a party to the treaty or any state or territory unanimously designated by the parties would endanger its own peace and safety.

In that event, they would consult to meet the common danger. In an understanding to the agreement, the United States stated that the treaty obligations applied only to communist aggression.

It provided a multilateral political framework for U. American forward military deployment in the Southeast Asia had been limited to the Philippines. American military base rights in the Philippines were provided for in the package of agreements in linked to Philippines independence. In other words, the multilateral treaty would function as a bilateral security pact between the U. This was the foundation of a U. It still provides a mul- tilateral vehicle within which Malaysia and Singapore can militarily cooperate in the absence of bilateral military training links.

The absence of any formal security tie to the United States allowed Malaysia and Singapore to maintain their international nonaligned stance. By the middle of the s the Cold War lines and structures were in place. The DRV and government of Vietnam faced each other across the seventeenth parallel. In neutral- ized Laos, the revolutionary forces of the Pathet Lao menaced the status quo, and in neutral Cambodia Prince-Prime Minister Norodom Sihanouk diplo- matically maneuvered to keep his country out of the fray.

In two meetings in , the prime ministers declared their opposition to interference in domes- tic affairs by external communist or anticommunist agencies. Looking to am- plify their regional voice, they convened in Bandung, Indonesia an April meeting of twenty-nine African and Asian heads of government and foreign ministers. It also was the debut of communist China as a regional political actor. The conference was driven by the twin themes of anti-imperialism and peaceful coexistence.

Building on the Bandung foundation, the NAM theoretically adopted a position of security equidistance between the Cold War great powers. Burma, a founding member, withdrew from the NAM because it was not truly neutral.

With the ending of the Cold War, the NAM sought to trans- form itself by shifting attention to social and economic problems in the de- veloping world. Radical voices are still raised. American advisors and material assistance worked to build a South Vietnamese political and mil- itary capability to withstand an emerging internal war led by Viet Minh cadres left behind at partition.

The armed insurgents were called the Viet Cong Vietnamese Communists. Amer- ican President John F. Kennedy decided to introduce fifteen thousand U. Hanoi denounced the American role as imperialism. The conflict spilled over into Laos and Cambodia as the United States tried to interdict North Vietnamese supply lines to the south along the so- called Ho Chi Minh trail and to strike enemy sanctuaries.

In the first chapter of the paper, the problem and purpose are set out, along with definitions of some CSR terminology and delimitations of the paper. In the second chapter, literature from various sources such as the ProQuest electronic database is reviewed and critiqued.

These findings are further synthesized in chapter five, which contains an overall analysis of findings in chapters two, three, and four. Chapter six contains concluding remarks on the subject matter and suggested directions for further empirical research on the subject. Jan Jonker. Florian Wettstein. Sophia Vakhidova. Bill Baue. Lance Moir , Kai Hockerts. Based on an inductive study we analyse the role of the investor relations IR function in the light of rising investor concern about Corporate Social Responsibility CSR.

The study draws on interviews with IR professionals in twenty firms. It highlights their awareness of CSR issues as well as their assessment of concern among mainstream investors and socially responsible investors SRIs. Darshi Fernando. Timothy Nash. Matthew Burnett-Stuart. This paper analyses only the results of the mapping of companies, multi-stakeholder initiatives MSIs , and stock exchanges.

This paper is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the analysis of a selected number of companies, the second with the survey of MSIs and the third with stock exchanges and their listing requirements. Each section breaks down the trends and gaps in their language pertaining to specific human rights and reporting mechanisms. Log in with Facebook Log in with Google.

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